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Abstract: 
How quickly do the CAMEL ratings regulators assign to banks during on-site examinations 
become "stale"?  One measure of the information content of CAMEL ratings is their ability to 
discriminate between banks that will fail and those that will survive.  To assess the accuracy of 
CAMEL ratings in predicting failure, Rebel Cole and Jeffery Gunther use as a benchmark an off-
site monitoring system based on publicly available accounting data.  Their findings suggest that, 
if a bank has not been examined for more than two quarters, off-site monitoring systems usually 
provide a more accurate indication of survivability than its CAMEL rating.  The lower predictive 
accuracy for CAMEL ratings “older” than two quarters causes the overall accuracy of CAMEL 
ratings to fall substantially below that of off-site monitoring systems.  The higher predictive 
accuracy of off-site systems derives from both their timeliness—an updated off-site rating is 
available for every bank in every quarter—and the accuracy of the financial data on which they 
are based.  Cole and Gunther conclude that off-site monitoring systems should continue to play a 
prominent role in the supervisory process, as a complement to on-site examinations.  
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How long does a supervisory rating derived from an on-site examination of a bank's 
financial condition adequately reflect the bank's financial viability?  Insofar as financial 
conditions can, and often do, change rapidly, we would not expect a given examination rating to 
remain accurate for long periods of time.  Yet, during the late 1980s, a tumultuous period for the 
banking industry characterized by high failure rates, many banks went for several years between 
on-site examinations.  The need for more up-to-date examination ratings was recognized by 
Congress and codified in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA), which requires regulators to conduct annual on-site examinations.1  However, even 
annual on-site examinations cannot always detect rapid changes in a bank’s financial condition.  
The question remains as to how quickly the bank examination ratings commonly known as 
"CAMEL" ratings become "stale". 
We attempt to answer this question by analyzing the historical relationship between 
examination ratings and bank failures.  Although failure prediction is not the primary purpose of 
the CAMEL rating, its ability to predict failures offers a convenient metric for assessing the 
decay of information contained in an examination rating.   
To assess the accuracy of examination ratings in predicting failure, we use as a 
benchmark an off-site monitoring system based on publicly available accounting data.  This 
system is very much similar to one component of the Federal Reserve’s comprehensive Financial 
Institutions Monitoring System (FIMS), which the Fed implemented in 1993 to monitor the 
                                                 
1
 FDICIA permits banks that are small, well-capitalized, and highly rated to be examined only once every eighteen 
months.  
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condition of banks between examinations.2  If up-to-date examination ratings are an accurate 
measure of financial condition, then their ability to predict bank failures should be at least as high 
as that of the ratings generated by our off-site monitoring system.  In analyzing the predictive 
accuracy of examination ratings, we take into account the length of time between on-site 
examinations and subsequent failures because we expect recent examinations to be more accurate 
in predicting failures than examinations conducted in the relatively distant past.   
Our findings suggest that the information content of examination ratings decays rather 
quickly.  Specifically, the ability of examination ratings to anticipate failures appears to exceed 
that of off-site monitoring systems only when the ratings used are based on on-site examinations 
conducted no more than two quarters earlier.  If a bank has not been examined for more than two 
quarters, our findings suggest that off-site monitoring systems can provide a more accurate 
indication of survivability.  The reduction in predictive accuracy for relatively "old" CAMEL  
atings causes the overall accuracy of CAMEL ratings to fall substantially below that of off-site 
monitoring systems.   
Off-site monitoring systems are critically dependent upon the accuracy of their 
accounting data inputs, however, and the integrity of those data can only be ensured by periodic 
on-site examinations.  These systems also may have difficulty in identifying emerging problems 
unless these problems manifest themselves through the accounting data inputs.  It seems likely 
that on-site examinations are more likely to identify such paradigm shifts, and to require that 
                                                 
2
 The Federal Reserve uses FIMS not only to track the financial condition of individual banks and banking 
organizations between on-site examinations but also to direct examination resources.  An overview of FIMS is 
provided by Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther (1995). Putnam (1983) describes the bank surveillance systems used by 
regulators during the 1970s and early 1980s.  
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banks recognize emerging financial difficulties through reserves and charge-offs.  Moreover, 
systems such as our benchmark require that we observe relatively frequent failures, and, 
historically, there has been a paucity of bank failures.3  We therefore conclude that off-site 
monitoring systems should continue to play a prominent role in the supervisory process, but only 
as a complement to comprehensive, on-site examinations.  In addition, our results indicate that an 
off-site monitoring model, such as the one used to produce our benchmark ratings, would be a 
valuable tool for anyone interested in tracking the financial condition of individual banks. 
 
On-site monitoring 
The Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, adopted in 1979, provides federal 
bank regulatory agencies with a framework for rating the financial condition and performance of 
individual banks.  Regulators periodically visit banking offices to evaluate their financial 
                                                 
3
 To generate accurate forecasts, offsite monitoring systems such as ours typically require that we 
observe 50-100 failures.  Yet in 1993 and 1994, there were only 43 and 11 bank failures 
respectively.  Historically, from the mid-1930s until the early 1980s, no more than 20 bank 
failures were recorded in any one year.  Whether systems based upon the failure experience of the 
1980s will be accurate in predicting failures during the 1990s and beyond is open to debate. 
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soundness, to monitor their compliance with laws and regulatory policies, and to assess the 
quality of their management and systems of internal control.4   
                                                 
4
  According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Committee on Working Procedures, “internal 
control comprises the plan of organization and all of the coordinate methods and measures adopted within a business 
to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and 
encourage adherence to subscribed managerial policies.” 
Based on the results of these on-site evaluations, regulators then rate the performance of 
individual banks along five key dimensions—capital adequacy, asset quality, management, 
earnings, and liquidity—yielding the rating system's acronym, CAMEL.  Each of the five areas of 
performance are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 as follows:  1—strong performance, 2—satisfactory 
performance, 3—performance that is flawed to some degree, 4—marginal performance that is 
significantly below average, and 5—unsatisfactory performance that is critically deficient and in 
need of immediate remedial action. 
Once each of the five areas of performance has been assigned a rating, a composite, or 
overall, rating is derived, again on a scale from 1 to 5.  The five composite rating levels are 
described as follows in the Commercial Bank Examination Manual produced by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System:  1—an institution that is basically sound in every 
respect, 2—an institution that is fundamentally sound but has modest weaknesses, 3—an 
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institution with financial, operational, or compliance weaknesses that give cause for supervisory 
concern, 4—an institution with serious financial weaknesses that could impair future viability, 
and 5—an institution with critical financial weaknesses that render the probability of failure 
extremely high in the near term.          
The frequency of on-site examinations has varied considerably over recent years.  Before 
FDICIA's adoption, banks often were not subject to annual examinations.5  Because a bank's 
financial condition can change appreciably from one quarter to the next, more frequent on-site 
examinations provide a more accurate assessment of a bank's current financial condition.  And 
the earlier regulators can identify a troubled bank, the more quickly they can intervene with 
supervisory actions intended to return the bank to financial health or, if necessary, close the bank 
so as to minimize losses to the Bank Insurance Fund.6   
The benefits of more frequent on-site examinations, however, must be weighed against 
the substantial costs of such examinations to both regulators and banks.  The perceived trade-off 
between the costs and benefits of more frequent examinations has precluded Congress from 
requiring more than an annual frequency of on-site examinations.7  When banks are only subject 
to annual on-site examinations, the task of monitoring individual banks on a more frequent basis 
devolves to off-site monitoring systems such as FIMS. 
                                                 
5
 State-chartered banks regulated by the Federal Reserve generally were subject to annual 
examinations even before the FDICIA mandate. 
6
 Gilbert (1993) provides evidence that failing banks examined in their last twelve months of 
operation imposed lower losses on the Bank Insurance Fund, as a percentage of their assets, than 
banks that were not examined near the time of failure.  
7
 It is important to note that “problem banks,” those with composite CAMEL ratings of 4 or 5, 
are generally subject to an on-site examination twice per year. 
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Off-site monitoring 
Various off-site monitoring systems have been developed to complement the CAMEL 
rating system.  While these systems have employed a wide variety of analytical tools, most have 
relied on a common source of data—the Report of Condition and Income, or "call report"—
which each bank submits quarterly to its primary regulatory agency.  The financial data contained 
in this report provide timely information on the performance of individual banks and a strong 
foundation for off-site monitoring systems.   
It is important to note that one of the primary functions of the on-site examination process 
is to ensure that each bank has in place a system of internal control that checks the accuracy and 
reliability of its accounting data.  Without accurate accounting data, off-site systems cannot 
detect banks whose financial condition is deteriorating. 
To illustrate the nature and function of off-site monitoring systems, we develop a system 
based on key financial ratios derived from the bank call report data.  In this system, we use 
standard statistical methods to estimate the relationship between the financial ratios measured at 
year-end 1985 for all U.S. insured commercial banks and the likelihood of bank failure during 
the two-year period from the second quarter of 1986 through the first quarter of 1988.8 
                                                 
8
 Failures are identified starting in the second quarter of 1986, rather than the first quarter, to 
impose a one-quarter lag in the estimated relationship. This is done to approximate real-world 
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conditions, under which edited call report data generally are not available until forty-five to 
seventy days after the end of each quarter.  Consequently, failures occurring during that first 
quarter are excluded from the analysis.  When the estimated relationship is used to predict future 
bank failures, lags in the reporting of call report data imply a short lag between the call report 
date and the period over which failures are predicted.   
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We use seven financial indicators, each measured as a percentage of gross assets, to 
characterize the financial posture of individual banks.  As shown in Table 1, these indicators are 
measures of capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity—four of the five components 
of the CAMEL rating.  Equity capital, which serves as a buffer protecting a bank's solvency 
against financial losses, is our measure of capital adequacy; more capital is expected to reduce 
the chance of failure.  We use three indicators of asset quality—loans past due 90 days or more 
and still accruing interest, nonaccrual loans, and other real estate owned (which, for the most 
part, consists of foreclosed real estate).  Higher values of each indicator should increase the 
probability of failure in subsequent years.   To measure earnings, we use net income as our 
indicator.  Higher income generally reflects a lack of financial difficulties and so also would be 
expected to reduce the likelihood of failure.  Finally, we use two indicators of liquidity—
investment securities and large certificates of deposit ($100,000 or more).  Liquid assets, such as 
investment securities, enable a bank to respond quickly to unexpected demands for cash and 
typically reflect relatively conservative financial strategies, whereas volatile liabilities, such as 
large certificates of deposit, often reflect relatively aggressive financial strategies, impose high 
interest expenses, and are subject to quick withdrawal.  As a result, we expect higher values of 
investment securities to reduce the chance of failure, whereas higher values of large certificates 
of deposit should increase the probability of failure.        
The historical relationship between these financial indicators and failure is estimated 
using statistical methods.9  The estimation results indicate that the variables included in the 
                                                 
9
 Specifically, our off-site monitoring system uses the probit methodology to estimate the 
historical relationship between the financial indicators and the likelihood of failure.  The 
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system are important indicators of bank survivability and that each affects the probability of 
failure in the expected fashion.  With the estimated relationship in hand, we can now insert into 
the system values of the seven financial indicators reported for year-end 1987 to generate 
predictions of the probability of failure for individual banks over the two-year period from the 
second quarter of 1988 through the first quarter of 1990.  This exercise illustrates the manner in 
which regulators use off-site monitoring systems in practice.  A historical relationship is 
estimated between a set of financial indicators and the likelihood of bank failure, which then 
provides the basis for generating predictions of future failures.  Here, we compare the predicted 
probabilities of failure for the period from the second quarter of 1988 through the first quarter of 
1990 with the failures that actually occurred, thereby establishing a sense of the system's 
predictive accuracy.  We can then use the off-site surveillance system to benchmark the ability of 
CAMEL ratings to anticipate bank failures. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
statistical underpinnings of this methodology are described by Maddala (1983).   
The information content of CAMEL ratings 
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To measure the information content of CAMEL ratings, we test their ability to 
discriminate between banks that will fail and banks that will survive.10  Accuracy in predicting 
bank failure is an important ingredient of a successful banking supervision program, but it is 
important to remember that CAMEL ratings were never intended to measure the probability of 
bank failure.  Instead, they were designed to serve as a summary measure of financial condition, 
not just a measure of catastrophic failure.  For example, a CAMEL rating can only take on five 
discrete values, making it difficult to discriminate among banks within each rating class.  
Moreover, regulators don’t expect every bank assigned a “5”-rating to fail.  Indeed, one goal of 
bank supervision is to intervene and take actions that will return troubled banks to financial 
health. 
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 Berger and Davies (1994) provide a detailed review of the academic literature on the value of 
the information generated by federal bank examinations.  Based on their own results, Berger and 
Davies conclude that CAMEL downgrades reveal previously private unfavorable information 
about bank condition. 
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To provide a benchmark for assessing the accuracy of CAMEL ratings in predicting 
failure, we use results from the off-site monitoring system presented in the previous section.  
Since CAMEL ratings incorporate confidential information from on-site examinations, as well as 
public information from the quarterly call reports and other sources, we expect that, in predicting 
bank failures, up-to-date CAMEL ratings would be more accurate than the ratings from our off-
site monitoring system.11  Moreover, both CAMEL ratings and off-site ratings should be 
significantly more accurate in predicting failure than a naive model that randomly selects a 
sample of banks as likely to fail. 
 
Are Timely CAMEL Ratings Informative?   
In assessing the predictive accuracy of CAMEL ratings, we take into account the length 
of time between on-site examinations and the beginning of our forecast period.  Because 
CAMEL ratings are assigned on a flow basis as examinations are completed, there are numerous 
vintages of CAMEL ratings available at any one time.  We expect the accuracy of CAMEL 
ratings in predicting failures to be a decreasing function of the length of time between the 
assignment of the rating and the beginning of the forecast period. 
   To test this hypothesis, we assess the accuracy of the CAMEL ratings for individual 
banks at year-end 1987 in predicting failures during the two-year period from the second quarter 
                                                 
11
 Jones and King (1995) report that on-site examination information improves the ability of risk-
based capital ratios derived from call report information to identify banks with a high risk of 
insolvency.  Moreover, call report information often depends on examination results, rather than 
the other way around, as on-site examinations frequently result in substantial changes to reported 
financial information.  Berger and Davies (1994) provide evidence that the call report acts as a 
conduit to transmit examination results to the public.  
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of 1988 through the first quarter of 1990.  Because all bank examinations are not conducted at 
the same time, the CAMEL ratings available at year-end 1987 were assigned during a wide span 
of time.  While many of the ratings were based on examinations conducted during the fourth 
quarter of 1987, many others were assigned much earlier and were based on examinations 
conducted during the previous year and even earlier.  Because the financial condition of 
individual banks can change appreciably from quarter to quarter, the CAMEL ratings based on 
examinations conducted near the end of 1987 should provide a better indication of future 
survivability than those based on examinations conducted a year or more earlier. 
To provide an indication of how well recent CAMEL ratings predict failure, we first limit 
our sample to ratings assigned “as of” the fourth quarter of 1987.12  Of the 9,880 insured 
commercial banks used in this analysis, 2,254 had CAMEL ratings assigned based on financial 
data from the fourth quarter.13  We sort the 2,254 banks from worst to best based on their 
composite CAMEL ratings.  Then, we sort the banks within each of the five possible composite 
ratings from worst to best based on the arithmetic average of their five CAMEL component 
                                                 
12
 There are three primary dates typically associated with an examination—the start date, the end 
date, and the “as of” date.  The “as of” date derives its name from the fact that it is the date for 
the financial data on which the CAMEL rating is based.  We use the “as of” date to match 
CAMEL ratings with the ratings from our off-site monitoring system, which also are dated based 
on the date of the financial data used. 
13
 The number of banks included in our analysis is limited by our access to historical CAMEL 
rating data.  Of the 13,365 U.S. insured commercial banks that meet the other requirements of 
our study, we are able to obtain year-end 1987 CAMEL ratings for 9,880, or 74 percent.  Of these 
9,880 banks, 244 failed during the two-year period examined.  Also, of the 9,880 banks, 9,740 
were rated based on a "full scope" examination, another 134 had ratings associated with "limited 
scope" examinations, and the remaining six were the subject of "targeted" examinations.  The 
results reported here are qualitatively identical when the analysis is limited to "full scope" 
examinations.    
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ratings.14  This is somewhat ad hoc, in that bank examiners do not intend for the component 
ratings to be used as a means of ranking banks within rating classes, but some such ranking 
procedure is necessary to obtain a metric comparable to our offsite monitoring score.  Using the 
resulting ranking as our guide, we expect the banks with the worst ratings to be the most likely to 
fail during the two-year period from second-quarter 1988 through first-quarter 1990.           
                                                 
     
14
  While the equal weighting of the five component ratings is somewhat arbitrary, we also 
used several alternative schemes to weight the five component ratings for determining ranks 
within composite CAMEL rating groups.  The results are not qualitatively different when 
alternative weightings are used. 
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Chart 1 shows the accuracy of the CAMEL ratings based on fourth-quarter 1987 financial 
data in predicting failures during the subsequent two-year period of interest (April 1988—March 
1990).15  The horizontal axis measures the proportion of banks predicted to fail.  For example, 
the value of 10 on the horizontal axis indicates that the top 10 percent of the sample of banks, as 
sorted from the worst to best CAMEL ratings, are predicted to fail.  The vertical axis gives, as a 
percentage of the total number of banks that actually failed, the number of failed banks correctly 
identified as failures.  So, for example, when the 10 percent of banks with the worst CAMEL 
ratings are predicted to fail, Chart 1 indicates that 89 percent of the failures that actually occurred 
are identified successfully.  In comparison, the 10 percent of the same sample of banks with the 
highest predicted probability of failure, as generated by the off-site monitoring system, includes 
87 percent of the failures that actually occurred.  Hence, when each system considers the 10 
percent of banks most likely to fail, recently assigned CAMEL ratings are slightly more accurate 
in identifying failures than are the ratings generated by our off-site monitoring system.   
Overall, the on-site and off-site systems' degrees of accuracy are comparable, as indicated 
by the tendency for the two curves in Chart 1 to remain fairly close together.  This is somewhat 
surprising as we might expect the on-site system to be considerably more accurate when only 
recently assigned ratings are used.  However, there is an important feedback effect that greatly 
benefits the offsite system.  During the examination, supervisors require banks that have not 
adequately reserved against or charged off losses to do so, and these actions are reflected in key 
call report data that are inputs to the off-site monitoring system, e.g., capital, earnings, and asset 
                                                 
15
 We exclude the first quarter of 1988 because examinations based upon December 1987 
financial statements would not be finalized until at least some point during the first quarter of 
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quality.  Hence, the more recent the examination, the more accurate is the call report data, and 
this accuracy improves the performance of the offsite monitoring system in identifying failures. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1988. 
Both systems perform much better than the expected results of the naive model that 
randomly selects potential failures.  For example, if 10 percent of the banks are selected at 
random and predicted to fail, only 10 percent of the failures would be successfully identified, on 
average.  This indicates that both recent CAMEL ratings and off-site ratings are highly accurate 
in predicting bank failure. 
 
How Soon Do CAMEL Ratings Become Stale?   
While recently assigned CAMEL ratings provide a good indication of the survival 
prospects for individual banks, the speed with which financial conditions can change suggests 
that CAMEL ratings assigned in the relatively distant past may not predict future failures as well 
as "fresh" CAMEL ratings.  To provide an indication of how well relatively dated CAMEL 
ratings predict failure, we augment our initial sample of banks rated as of fourth-quarter 1987 
with banks rated as of the third quarter of that year.  Of the 9,880 insured commercial banks used 
in this analysis, 4,529 had CAMEL ratings based on financial data from the third or fourth 
quarter.  Once again, we sort these individual banks from worst to best based on their composite 
CAMEL ratings and average CAMEL component ratings, with the expectation that those with 
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the worst ratings would be the most likely to fail during the two-year period from second-quarter 
1988 through first-quarter 1990. 
   Chart 2 shows the accuracy of the CAMEL ratings based on data from the third or fourth 
quarter of 1987 in predicting failures during the two-year period.  Overall, the on-site and off-site 
systems' levels of predictive accuracy are again comparable, as indicated by the closeness of the 
two curves.  When the 10 percent of the banks with the worst ratings are predicted to fail, the 
CAMEL ratings capture 88 percent of the failures that actually occurred, while the off-site 
monitoring system identifies 87 percent.  These findings suggest that, for the time period 
examined, no appreciable reduction occurs in the relative ability of CAMEL ratings to anticipate 
failures when examinations conducted one quarter earlier are augmented with examinations 
conducted two quarters earlier.   
A different picture emerges, however, when banks with a most recent examination of 
three quarters ago are also included in the analysis.  Chart 3 shows the accuracy of the CAMEL 
ratings as of the second, third, or fourth quarter of 1987 in predicting failures during the two-year 
period from second-quarter 1988 through first-quarter 1990.  Of the 9,880 insured commercial 
banks used in this analysis, 6,358 had CAMEL ratings based on financial data from the second, 
third, or fourth quarter.  When the banks with three-quarter-old CAMEL ratings are included in 
the analysis, the accuracy of the CAMEL ratings in predicting failures is appreciably less than 
that of the ratings (predicted probabilities of failure) generated by the off-site monitoring system. 
 When the 10 percent of the banks with the worst ratings are predicted to fail, the CAMEL 
ratings identify 78 percent of the failures that actually occurred, whereas the off-site ratings 
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identify 85 percent of the failures.16  Based on these findings, it appears that a substantial 
reduction occurs in the relative ability of CAMEL ratings to anticipate failures when 
examinations conducted one and two quarters earlier are augmented with examinations 
conducted three quarters earlier.17       
                                                 
16
 The lower success rate of the CAMEL ratings in identifying failures implies that the CAMEL 
ratings also mistakenly predict a greater number of surviving banks as failing. 
17
 This result is consistent with Gilbert and Park (1994), who find that early warning systems 
often can identify emerging problems at failing banks earlier than on-site examinations. 
The reduction in the predictive accuracy of CAMEL ratings continues when banks with 
four-quarter-old CAMEL ratings are included in the analysis.  Of the 9,880 insured commercial 
banks used in this analysis, 7,872 had CAMEL ratings based on financial data from the first 
through fourth quarters of 1987.  As shown in Chart 4, for this broader sample of banks, the 
ratings from the off-site monitoring system are substantially more accurate forecasts of bank 
failure than the CAMEL ratings.  When the 10 percent of the banks with the worst ratings are 
predicted to fail, the CAMEL ratings identify 73 percent of the failures that actually occurred, 
whereas the ratings from the off-site monitoring system capture 86 percent of the failures. 
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Finally, we consider all banks for which CAMEL ratings would have been available at  
year-end 1987.   Interestingly, of the 9,880 insured commercial banks analyzed, 2,008 had 
CAMEL ratings at year-end 1987 based on financial data from 1986 or earlier.  When these 
2,008 banks are included and the entire sample of 9,880 banks is analyzed, the accuracy of the 
off-site monitoring system relative to CAMEL ratings is even higher.  When the 10 percent of the 
banks with the worst ratings are predicted to fail, the CAMEL ratings identify only 74 percent of 
the failures that actually occurred, whereas the ratings from the off-site monitoring system 
identify 88 percent, as shown in Chart 5.  The reduction in predictive accuracy for relatively old 
CAMEL ratings causes the overall accuracy of CAMEL ratings to fall substantially below that of 
off-site monitoring systems.18 
These results indicate that CAMEL ratings can become stale rather quickly, pointing to 
the conclusion that off-site monitoring systems provide regulators with valuable information on 
bank survivability over and above the information generated by the examination process.  In 
practice, output from regulatory offsite monitoring systems is reviewed by supervisory personnel  
in conjunction with information obtained during previous on-site examinations and other sources 
including the Uniform Bank Performance Report and the Bank Holding Company Performance 
Report.  These latter reports are analytical tools created by supervisory personnel on a quarterly 
basis showing the effect of management decisions and economic conditions on a banks’ financial 
performance and balance sheet composition.  The results of this comprehensive off-site analysis 
                                                 
18
 For example, looking separately at the 2,008 banks with CAMEL ratings based on financial 
data from 1986 or earlier, the 10 percent with the worst CAMEL ratings includes only 59 percent 
of the subsequent failures, while the 10 percent with the worst off-site ratings includes 95 percent 
of the subsequent failures.  Similarly large differences in predictive accuracy occur for banks 
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are then used to accelerate the on-site examination of institutions showing financial deterioration; 
to identify the areas of most supervisory concern in those institutions already scheduled for 
examination; and to allocate the most experienced examiners to troubled institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                             
examined in the first and second quarters of 1987. 
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The findings reported here suggest that the information content of CAMEL ratings decays 
rapidly.  During the period examined, the ability of CAMEL ratings to anticipate failures is 
comparable to or better than that of off-site monitoring systems only when the CAMEL ratings 
are based on on-site examinations conducted no more than two quarters prior to the forecast 
period.  If a bank has not been examined for more than two quarters, then off-site monitoring 
systems more accurately indicate survivability.  The reduction in predictive accuracy for 
relatively old CAMEL ratings causes the overall accuracy of CAMEL ratings to fall substantially 
below that of off-site monitoring systems.  The higher predictive accuracy of off-site ratings 
derives from both their timeliness—an updated off-site rating is available for every bank in every 
quarter—and the accuracy of the call report data on which they are based.  Of course, these 
conclusions are based on the particular period analyzed, and may not generalize to all other 
periods.19   Nevertheless, the pattern of CAMEL ratings and bank failures during the recent 
period of banking difficulties points to the value of off-site monitoring systems as a supplement 
to the supervisory ratings generated from periodic on-site examinations.  We conclude that off-
site monitoring systems such as the Federal Reserve’s FIMS should continue to play a prominent 
role in the supervisory process.   
                                                 
19
  We obtained similar results when analyzing bank failures occurring during two year periods 
from 1988-92.  In later periods, there were too few failures to conduct any meaningful analysis. 
Only 41 banks failed during all of 1993, and even fewer in 1994.  We were prevented from 
analyzing earlier periods by our inability to obtain CAMEL ratings from those periods. 
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 Table 1 
 Financial Indicators Used in the Off-Site Surveillance System 
 
Expected effect on the 
Financial indicator *      likelihood of bank failure 
 
Capital Adequacy 
 
Equity capital       Reduce 
 
Asset Quality 
 
Loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing  Increase 
 
Nonaccrual loans      Increase 
 
Other real estate owned     Increase 
 
 
Earnings 
 
Net income       Reduce 
 
Liquidity 
 
Investment securities      Reduce 
 
Large certificates of deposit ($100,000 or more)  Increase 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Each indicator is measured relative to gross assets.  
DATA SOURCE:  Report of Condition and Income.  
 
 
